UIdaho Law

Digital Commons @ UIdaho Law
Idaho Supreme Court Records & Briefs

12-1-2014

Hilliard v. Murphy Land Co., LLC Appellant's
Reply Brief Dckt. 42093

Follow this and additional works at: https://digitalcommons.law.uidaho.edu/
idaho_supreme_court_record_briefs
Recommended Citation
"Hilliard v. Murphy Land Co., LLC Appellant's Reply Brief Dckt. 42093" (2014). Idaho Supreme Court Records & Briefs. 5140.
https://digitalcommons.law.uidaho.edu/idaho_supreme_court_record_briefs/5140

This Court Document is brought to you for free and open access by Digital Commons @ UIdaho Law. It has been accepted for inclusion in Idaho
Supreme Court Records & Briefs by an authorized administrator of Digital Commons @ UIdaho Law. For more information, please contact
annablaine@uidaho.edu.

IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF IDAHO

JAMES HILIARD AND BARBARA HILLIARD,

)
)

Plaintiffs-Cross Defendants-Appellants
vs.
MURPHY LAND COMPANY, LLC,
Defendant-Cross Respondent-Respondent.

)
)
)
)
)
)
)

Supreme Court No. 42093

APPELLANTS REPLY BRIEF

Appeal from the District Court, Third Judicial District of the State ofldaho, Owyhee
County

THE HONORABLE MOLLY J. HUSKEY, DISTRICT JUDGE

M. KARL SHURTLIFF
816 West Bannock, Suite 200
PO Box 1652
Boise, Idaho 83701-1652

STEVEN S. SCHOSSBERGER
MATTHEW P. GORDON
HAWLEY TROXELL ENNIS & HAWLEY, LLP
877 Main Street, Suite 1000
Boise, Idaho 83701

Telephone (208) 343-2900

WELDON S. WOOD
17 Alverno Court
Redwood City, California 94061

Telephone (208) 388-4975
Attorneys for Respondent

Telephone: (650) 743-1079
Attorneys for Appellants

FILED· COPY
DEC - 1 2014

IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF IDAHO

JAMES HILIARD AND BARBARA HILLIARD,
Plaintiffs-Cross Defendants-Appellants

vs.
MURPHYLANDCOMPANY,LLC,
Defendant-Cross Respondent-Respondent.

)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)

Supreme Court No. 42093

APPELLANTS REPLY BRIEF

Appeal from the District Court, Third Judicial District of the State of Idaho, Owyhee
County

THE HONORABLE MOLLY J. HUSKEY, DISTRICT JUDGE

TABLE OF CONTENTS

TABLE OF CASES AND AUTHORITIES

2

ARGUMENT

3

CONCLUSION

10

CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE

11

I

TABLE OF CASES AND AUTHORITIES
Bonz v Sudweeks, 119 Idaho 539,541,808 P.2d 876,878 (1991);

7

I.A.R. 40 and 41

3

LC.§§ 556 12-120 and 12-121

3

Hecla Min. Co. v. Star-Morning Min. Co., 122 Idaho 778, 785; 839
P.2d 1192, 1199 (1992)

9

Idaho State Universitv v. Mitchell, 97 Idaho 724, 730; 552 P.2s 776, 782 (1976)

6

Matter of Estate ofKeeven 126 Idaho 290,298; 882 P.2d 457,465
(Ct.App.(1994)

8

Losee v. Idaho Co., 148 Idaho 219,224; 220 P.3d 575, 580 (2009)

4

Mackowiak v. Harris, 146 Idaho 864; 204 P.3d 504 (2009)

3

Major v. Sec. Egup Corp. 155 Idaho 199; 307 P .3d 1225 (2013)

8

Merrill v. Duffy Reed Constr. Co., 82 Idaho 410,414; 353 P.2d 647,659 (1960)

7

Ryan v. Beisner, 123 Idaho 42, 44; 844 P.2d 24, 25 (Ct. App. 1992)

9

Zylsra v. State, No. 41421, 2014 Opinion No. 112, 2204 Ida.
LEXIS 293 (October 29, 2014)

4

2

I.ARGUMENT
A.

Attorney Fees on Appeal.

Hilliards requested that they be awarded attorney fees and costs on appeal pursuant
to the contract between the parties, and, in the alternative, under LC.§§ 12-120 and 12121. Murphy Land argues that Hilliards are foreclosed from basing their request for
attorney fees on the parties' contract because they did not argue that basis for fees to the
district court. However, Hilliards are not asking this Court to review the district court's
failure to award attorney fees and costs to them below; rather, they are seeking fees on
appeal.
Attorney fees on appeal are governed by I.A.R. 40 and 41, which require a party
seeking fees on appeal to assert the claim as an issue in its first brief. The Idaho Appellate
Courts have interpreted I.A.R. 41 to require the party seeking fees to state the basis for its
claim. There is no requirement in I.A.R. 40 or 41 that the party requesting fees must have
sought them below; nor do the rules mandate that the basis for fees on appeal must mirror
the grounds below. Idaho cases do not support Murphy Land's argument, 1 nor does
common sense. Indeed, it is not difficult to conceive of a case where the appeal was
frivolous and the proceedings below were not, or where a party did not seek fees at the
summary judgment stage because it did not prevail, but did request them on appeal when

1

The case cited by Murphy Land, Mackowiak v. Harris, 146 Idaho 864; 204 P.3d 504 (2009), does

not address the issue of attorney fees on appeal; rather it relates to issues not raised below.

3

asking to have the summary judgment overturned. Regarding contractual agreements for
attorney fees, the Idaho Supreme Court has stated:
Contractual terms providing for recovery of attorney fees incurred in actions
to enforce the contract represent an election between the parties to place the
risk of litigation costs on the one who is ultimately unsuccessful. This
Court has held that these provisions are generally honored in ldaho.2

Murphy Land's argument regarding Hilliards' request for attorney fees on appeal is
without merit.

B.

Abuse of Discretion in Striking Affidavits.

Murphy Land argues that the district court did not abuse its discretion in striking
portions of the affidavits of Ken Edmunds, Jay Clark, James C. Hilliard and Robert F.
Bennett. Murphy Land correctly states the legal standard for abuse of discretion: "A trial
court does not abuse its discretion if it (1) correctly perceives the issues as discretionary,
(2) acts within the bounds of discretion and applies the correct legal standards, and (3)
reaches the decision through an exercise ofreason."3 However, Murphy Land's argument
ignores the elephant in the room. Did the trial court apply the correct legal standard? The
trial court clearly did not understand the limitations placed upon it in summary judgment
proceedings when it stated that it was "allowed to assess credibility [of witnesses]" at the

2

Losee v. Idaho Co., 148 Idaho 219, 224; 220 P.3d 575, 580 (2009) (internal citations
omitted).
3 Zylstra v. State. No. 41421, 2014 Opinion No. 112, 2204 Ida. LEXIS 293 (October 29, 2014)
(emphasis added).

4

summary judgment stage. 4 The trial court on the record stated it did not find at least one of
the witnesses credible, and that there was conflicting testimony on issues pertinent to the
summary judgment. 5 The trial court's statements make it difficult to have confidence that
it applied the correct legal standard, and taint the entirety of its analysis in striking the
affidavits.
Assuming, arguendo, that the Edmunds Affidavit was properly stricken for failure
to comply with the trial court's scheduling order, the Clark Affidavit was not. Murphy
Land alleges that the district court found that Clark was testifying as an expert, untimely
disclosed. However, the transcript citation referenced in Murphy Land's brief states: "To
the extent Mr. Clark is being offered as an expert, the Court is going to strike his affidavit
in its entirety. He has not been disclosed as an expert. To the extent he is a layperson, then
there will be a different standard and will allow the affidavit as to a layperson."6
As the district court recognized, Mr. Clark was testifying as a layperson, not an
expert. After making that finding, the district court went on to strike portions of Clark's
affidavit as irrelevant, and refused to consider other portions on credibility issues. The
trial court stated: "Now, the Court is going to note specifically that any farming that
occurred on 2011, 2012, the Court is not going to allow Mr. Clark to rely on that. It has

4

Tr., p. 124, II. 19-20.

5

Tr., pp. 123-124.

6

Tr., p. 36, 11. 11-17.

5

been determined that he was wrongfully in possession of that property during that time
frame." 7 Those statements, taken in conjunction with the trial court's later statements that
it found Clark not credible, clearly call into question whether the trial court applied the
correct legal standards in determining the motion to strike his affidavit, and whether the
entire process was tainted by the trial court's mistaken belief that it was entitled to assess
Clark's credibility at the summary judgment stage.

C.

Harmless Error.

While admitting that the district court "took issue with Clark's credibility," Murphy
Land argues that it was harmless error for it to do so. Murphy Land's argument ignores the
well-established foundation for evaluating a motion for summary judgment. As the Idaho
Supreme Court stated: "It is well-settled that a trial court is not allowed to weigh the
evidence or assess the credibility of witnesses on summary judgment."8 Violation of the
basic rule against assessment of witness credibility cannot be harmless error.
Reviewing the trial court's assessment of Clark's affidavit, it is clear that the
court's judgment was colored by its belief that the witness was not credible. The court
refused to consider testimony about the 2011 and 2012 crop years because it found Clark
was in wrongful possession of the property during that time. It found Clark's testimony
that the ground had been prepared for planting in 2011 to be irrelevant, notwithstanding the

7

Tr., p. 37, 11. 1-6.

8

Idaho State University v. Mitchell, 97 Idaho 724, 730; 552 P.2s 776, 782 (1976).

6

fact that Murphy Land claimed it had expenses for ground preparation, to its damage. It
refused to consider that testimony because "the reason that he knew the facts that
predicated Bis that he was unwilling to vacate the property, despite being told to do so."9
The trial court then stated that it would not allow Clark to testify because he "was
wrongfully in possession." 10 The trial court refused to consider Clark's testimony
regarding historical production of the land, omitted costs which had been historically
incurred, acres actually farmed, and other matters of which Clark had personal knowledge.
The entire process was colored, distorted and tainted by the trial court's belief that Clark
was not credible, and that it could make that assessment at the summary judgment stage of
the proceedings.

D. Summary Judgment Standard.
Murphy Land would have this Court disregard the well-established standards for
summary judgment: that motions for summary judgment should be granted with caution, 11
and that a motion for summary judgment should be denied if the relevant documents raise
any question of credibility of witnesses or weight of the evidence. 12 Instead, Murphy Land
posits that the trial court's credibility finding "might not be error" and should therefore be

9

Tr., p. 40, II. 15-18.

10

Tr.,p.39,11. 1-10.

11

Bonz v. Sudweeks, I 19 Idaho 539,541,808 P.2d 876,878 (1991);

12

Merrill v. Duffy Reed Constr. Co., 82 Idaho 410,414; 353 P.2d 647,659 (1960).

7

upheld. It further asks the Court to excuse the trial judge's "sham affidavit" analysis
because it may have been following dicta from the Court of Appeals decision in Keeven. 13
However, as Murphy Land acknowledges, the Idaho Supreme Court decision in Major v.

Sec. Equp. Corp. 14 came down several months before the trial court ruled on the summary
judgment motion in the instant case. The Major Court specifically stated that the Idaho
Supreme Court has never adopted the sham affidavit doctrine, 15 and that "a sham affidavit
finding necessarily turns on a credibility finding as well as a finding of bad faith. That is
beyond the power of the trial courts at the summary judgment phase." 16 Nevertheless, the
trial court clearly found that Clark's two affidavits contradicted each other, and utilized
that finding both in striking portions of Clark's affidavit filed in this action, and in
determining damages. 17 Those findings constituted error and an abuse of discretion.
The district court ignored its duty to liberally construe facts in favor of Hilliards;
indeed, it divested itself of that duty by improperly striking all of Hilliards' relevant
evidence. The court impermissibly expanded its powers as the ultimate trier of fact based
upon the Ritchie doctrine to include determination of witness credibility. The district court

13

126 Idaho 290,298; 882 P.2d 457,465 (Ct. App. 1994).

14

155 Idaho 199; 307 P.3d 1225 (2013).

15

Major, supra, 155 Idaho at 204.

16

Id, I 55 Idaho at 205.

17

Tr.. pp.116-117.

8

relied upon speculative evidence in determining damages, basing such reliance on its
assumption that Hilliards had provided no rebuttal evidence; again, only because the court
had stricken all ofHilliards' evidence rebutting Murphy Land's damage claims.
Murphy Land's arguments would have this Court ignore its own well-established
standards, and uphold a patently defective grant of summary judgment. They are flawed,
and should not be relied upon.

E. Tiegs Affidavit.
Murphy Land argues that the trial court had no responsibility to sua sponte review
the admissibility of the Tiegs Affidavit. However, that assertion ignores the rule that
"evidence presented in support of or in opposition to a motion for summary judgment must
be admissible." 18 A trial court is empowered to review proffered evidence on its own
motion. 19 In this case, the trial court recognized there may be a factual question about
damages 20 and that the damages claimed by Murphy Land may be speculative; however,
the court then found that because Hilliards failed to "sufficiently refute" Tiegs'
conclusions, the court had no alternative but to allow them to stand. 21 Without re-plowing
the ground regarding the Clark affidavit, which did refute Tiegs' conclusions, the trial court

18

Hecla Min. Co. v. Star-Morning Min. Co., 122 Idaho 778, 785; 839 P.2d 1 I 92, 1199 (I 992).

19

Id.; see also Ryan v. Beisner, 123 Idaho 42, 44; 844 P.2d 24, 25 (Ct. App. 1992).

20

Tr., pp. 114-118.

21

Tr. Pp. I 17-118, 11. 20-7.

9

was mistaken in its belief that it had no other alternative. The court's failure to exercise its
gatekeeping function on the threshold question of admissibility of evidence, which should
have led it to subject the Tiegs' affidavit to the same standard as were the affidavits of
Hillards, was an abuse of discretion.
II.

CONCLUSION
The trial court failed to understand and follow the proper standard for summary
judgment in Idaho. It abused its discretion when it assessed the credibility of witnesses. It
abused its discretion when it weighed Clark's previous affidavit against the one filed in this
case. The trial court erred when it analyzed the affidavits proffered by Hilliards, and it
erred when it accepted, without scrutiny, Murphy Land's affidavits. Summary judgment
cannot lie under these circumstances, and the judgment of the trial court should be
reversed.
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